Taking down the right and destroying the AKP requires the continued struggle against fascism and the struggle for rights. The AKP’s fascism can only be destroyed by permanent resistance on the part of socialists What changed in just the five months from June to November that the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) voting percentage rose […]
Taking down the right and destroying the AKP requires the continued struggle against fascism and the struggle for rights. The AKP’s fascism can only be destroyed by permanent resistance on the part of socialists
What changed in just the five months from June to November that the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) voting percentage rose from 40.9 to 49.4%?
In the span of these five months, the AKP was neither able to rectify Turkey’s outstanding political, societal or economic problems, nor was it able to lay out aims for future political, societal or economic successes to Turkish society. This rise of 8.5% was neither the product of a tangible success nor of support proffered in the expectation of the fulfillment of future goals.
To ensure this rise, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and company designed a special plan, duly implementing it on a macro and micro level over the past five months. The main prong of this strategy – fomenting instability and leaving the people to search for a return to stability – was visible to the naked eye, and it was no coincidence that the AKP’s main slogan was “Vote for Stability.” This tactic was first implemented in Kurdish provinces in which the state ostensibly started a fight against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) but, in reality, launched a war to force the entire Kurdish people into submission. It is evident that this tactic had an effect on members of the Kurdish electorate. At the same time, the AKP’s nationalist rhetoric also had an effect on Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) voters, particularly in Eastern and Central Anatolia.
After illegitimately refusing to accept the results of the 7 June election results, the move by Erdoğan’s Palace to implement terror and a show of force in the run-up to the 1 November elections soon spread to the entire country, forcing upon all citizens an atmosphere of war. It was with such a rationale that the Suruç and Ankara massacres were conducted, on 20 July and 10 October, respectively. In total, 700 people lost their lives in five months of clashes and massacres.
During this period, internet sites from the Kurdish and leftist media were closed repeatedly and newspapers were frequently targeted, to the point that the AKP’s privately organized Ottoman Hearths and other paramilitaries even attacked daily Hürriyet while also beating Ahmet Hakan, a columnist for the paper, in front of his home.
Additionally, buildings belonging to leftist organizations, including the People’s Houses (Halkevkleri) and the Republican People’s Party (CHP) – but particularly the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) – were targeted between 7 and 9 September. All told, 190 attacks were launched against HDP buildings around the country.
Kurdish towns were also put under siege as part of a series of curfews amid death threats to all those that refused to surrender to the AKP, forced migrations and the arrest of close to 500 HDP members and administrators.
The violence perpetrated against Kurds, the left and leftists, together with the creation of a “leftist enemy,” was designed to rally rightist voters under the flag of the AKP.
Meanwhile, although the voter turnout was the same as 7 June, it seems a portion of leftist voters did not go to the polls this time around, to be replaced by AKP voters.
In June, a nationalist-religious alliance of the Felicity Party (SP) and the Great Unity Party (BBP) scored 2.1 percent, but this figure fell to 1.5 in November, with the difference heading to the AKP.
In addition to these general strategies, there were also a number of tactics designed for specific needs, particularly the organization of campaign activities. Thanks to the terror implemented and the creation of a fear of suicide bombings, the AKP was effectively the only party that was able to conduct rallies. The media was also effectively besieged, becoming a propaganda machine for a single party. Learning from 7 June, the AKP ensured that HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş appeared on next to no TV channel. Moreover, the move to pull the plug on TV channels tied to the movement of Fethullah Gülen, the ally-turned-foe of the government, served as a warning to others. On the streets, meanwhile, nearly all the billboards were allocated exclusively for use by the AKP. The goal of all practices was to ensure that no other party had the power to compete with the AKP.
The AKP also altered 40% of its candidate lists, bringing back former MPs that had been sidelined by the party’s three-term limit, as well as former ministers, in a move to both silence internal opposition and create the impression of a powerful team.
To this one can add the fact that the party made use of state resources and patronage links in solidifying its power. Naturally, few dispute that electoral irregularities and other voting fraud adds about 1 to 3% for the AKP.
At the risk of repetition, a sense of instability was designed and implemented. While economic and political instability, in the form of the potential for a coalition government, were important parts of this strategy, the most important leg of this tactic was the fomenting of societal instability based on the threat of civil war.
Using instability in such a fashion to win representation clearly will never provide legitimacy to those in power. The fruits of the practices over the past five months cannot and must not be accepted by any political actor. [1]
Despite everything, Erdoğan was unable to force the HDP under the electoral threshold and, more importantly, he was unable to attain the number of MPs needed to unilaterally alter the constitution. Instead, he merely gained time to prolong his power a little longer.
A country with the AKP at the helm will no longer be a source of stability but permanent instability. At the same time, the AKP has sharpened the dynamics amid the battle between those in power and the people in an effort to protect itself.
The true election result was 7 June, and all AKP members and supporters are aware that 1 November was a “fabricated result.” The AKP does not have the support of a calcified 40% of the electorate. Even if the AKP appears to be in power alone in the parliament, the street is the sole preserve of those that are against the AKP and particularly Erdoğan and his Palace.
For socialists, it is important to remember that the “fleeting” successes of the left in this country will never succeed in remaining permanent of their own accord; just to achieve permanence requires the continuation of a long struggle. At the same time, it behoves us to remember that the right will never by changed or defeated at the ballot box in this country.
During the progression of a political and societal revolution, it is necessary to regard “moments” that appear as either defeats or victories as components of a long historical process and appreciate that all of these “moments” will play a role in ultimate success.
These election results will not revive the dreams of imposing a presidential system on the country, nor will they create the conditions forcing all to bow down in homage to a dictator. The only result they will foster is the creation of a larger foundation for opposition and greater anger. Moreover, this new government will not be new; we already know what it will do and how. The two inseparable components to taking down the right and destroying the AKP will remain the struggle against fascism and the struggle for rights. The AKP’s reactionary fascism can only be destroyed by determined and permanent resistance on the part of socialists.
[1] It is necessary to note the unfortunate spectacle of the HDP’s statement that was made just hours after the announcement of the initial results. While noting the incidents that had proceeded the election, just as the people were standing guard at the ballot box to protect their votes, the HDP’s move to immediately accept the results of an election that was organized with illegitimate tactics, talk about the normal functioning of parliament and emphasize calls for discretion were the last things that society’s opposition wished to hear at that moment. One must also note how CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu intoned that they would “respect the results” – immediately after noting that the 1 November elections were conducted in “extraordinary” circumstances.