It no longer appears possible for the revolt to be extinguished without winning some gains. Can the June Revolt defeat PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan? It can. Can the June Revolt defeat the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government? That is the real question.

Will Taksim become Tahrir? It appears it might – it will no longer be easy to recapture Taksim from the revolt. The people’s mobilization for TaksimGeziPark and against the Prime Ministry’s Office is a concrete symbol that has acted as a catalyst for the movement.

At the heart of the matter is the fact that the “Gezi Revolt” has now become the “June Revolt.” The rebellion has spread to nearly all of Turkey’s provinces, developing into a “Revolt Against Erdoğan” rather than support for Gezi.

It no longer appears possible for the revolt to be extinguished without winning some gains. The revolt will continue – we will either be victorious or we will be defeated.

After “taking a breath” in the squares of the country, the revolt has now succeeded in building up steam to take the next step. (In this, it is impossible to over-exaggerate the role of Erdoğan’s arrogance in bringing the events to this point. Regardless of Erdoğan’s attempts to tar the protesters as just a bunch of “marauders,” the night-time protests in neighbourhoods everywhere, the fact that GeziPark has become a fortified stronghold, and the fights in Ankara’s Kızılay Square and İzmir’s Gündoğdu Square have all provided enough fuel for the fire of revolt.)

Some said normal life would resume after Sunday and that people would redirect their attention to more mundane tasks with less time to devote to the revolt, but attention to the rebellion has spread to people’s days off and evenings after work. Now, there are “Rebel Hearths” in the neighbourhoods of all major cities.

As evidenced by the lunch-time protest against NTV – in which protesters marched to the channel’s headquarters to demonstrate against its poor coverage of the incidents – it appears that people are becoming accustomed to forming Rebel Hearths in centers of production. Together with progressive labour organizations’ decision to launch strike action and related labour action, the revolt has spread to areas encompassing the process of production and workplaces.

Thanks to the widening of the revolt, the working class movement possesses a variety of options to end its past “misfortunes.” For example, the Hava-İş strike, which has been weakened by the creation of different self-interests among workers, can no longer continue contingent on circumstances wholly internal to Turkish Airlines (THY). Airlines workers that have not taken part in the strike, together with “mercenary” strikebreakers, will realize that they are no longer just underpinning THY’s management, but Erdoğan’s power as well. The schizophrenia of banging together pots and pans – which has become a form of nightly protest since the beginning of the revolt – on one hand while working as a strikebreaker on the other is unsustainable.

What does the future of the June Revolt hold?

When considering the revolt’s future, there are three events that it would be wise to remember: “Susurluk,” which brought to light the links between police, mafia and politicians in 1996 and acted as a prelude to the removal of the Islamist government in the 28 February process of 1997, Erdoğan’s “road cleaning” victory of 1 March and the events of Tahrir Square that brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt.

There are real risks that the revolt could go “off track,” become just a “step” or be “stolen.” The obstacles currently acting as a hindrance for the revolt are its lack of a political centre, the gap between the leadership of the revolt and its masses, as well as the societal dynamics of the phenomenon.

In terms of addressing these shortcomings, it appears that the “popular energy” that has been released through the process of revolt itself will produce an important portion of the necessary strength and resources. This notwithstanding, producing these necessities also requires a voluntarily will.

The deficiency stemming from a lack of a political centre is the most prominent of the aforementioned risks. Despite this, the emergence of organs that could eliminate this problem is possible if the revolt can become sustainable and if large movements like a general or popular strike come to the forefront.

The Turkish socialist movement, progressive labour movement, and the spreading of networks of mass resistance to poor neighbourhoods all possess serious potential in this regard.

The second major risk is the difference in political composition between the powers directing the revolt and the powers forming its masses.

Socialists constitute the majority of the leadership of the movement, but the majority of the masses who have joined the movement have not yet acquired a clear political identity. It is clear that many of those in the mass comprising the movement have previously had ties to the “Republican” opposition movement. This factor will make it difficult for those at the head of the revolt to create its own political leadership “from within;” this problem is also compounded by the Kurdish political movement’s hesitant stance on the revolt.

The Kurdish political movement is understandably hesitant toward the June Revolt due to its concerns for the future of the “Peace and Democratic Solution” process, while it also has concerns that ousting the AKP could overturn the negotiating table it has worked so painstakingly to establish after years of struggle. These fears are compounded by the fact that an important portion of the grassroots that have been mobilized by the June Revolt are “poisoned” by “nationalist” influences.

What is crucial, however, is that with the explosion of the June Revolt, the composition of Turkey’s political forces will be irrevocably altered, regardless of whether or not Erdoğan is ousted. Whether or not the revolt succeeds, the composition of the rebel forces will determine the course of the “Peace and Democratic Solution” belonging to whatever new force is created.

Regardless of whether or not the Kurdish political movement is part of the revolt, and regardless of whether Erdoğan is defeated or whether he suppresses the revolt, we must comprehensively discuss the possibilities when we examine the options.

The “Peace and Democratic Solution Process,” the Revolution in Rojava (the Kurdish-populated area of northern Syria) and last year’s “domination of the squares” are all outcomes based on realities. These factors will not change whatever the fate of the June Revolt.

As such, regardless of whether Erdoğan goes or stays, the “negotiating table” will not be easily overturned, but the relationship with any new actor sitting on the other side would change; the issue at hand is to determine what direction this change will take.

In the event that the Kurdish movement joins the revolt in combination with a defeat for Erdoğan, the chances that the “nationalist” components will be able to shape a post-Erdoğan era are slim. It is an open reality that the Kurdish political movement’s role in the genesis of the June Revolt, together with socialists’ leading position in the rebellion, have helped obstruct the nationalist tendencies of the movement’s masses while also suppressing hostility towards Kurds. If Erdoğan is defeated by an alliance of Kurdish and Turkish democratic forces, the path will be opened to a movement predicated on a spirit of “joint foundation” in the post-Erdoğan era. As such, the “negotiation process” would be transformed into a “joint foundation process” for a new republic.

However, if the Kurdish movement stays on the sidelines of the revolt as Erdoğan is defeated, then there will be no chance for the creation of a “joint foundation” – even if the negotiating table remains in place.

On the other hand, if Erdoğan retains his power despite the Kurdish political movement’s contributions to the revolt, then he will have a weaker hand at the negotiating table due to the blows he received; likewise, he will also not be able to continue his repressive policies.

But if the prime minister retains his grip on power while the Kurdish movement remains aloof, then the latter will remain beholden to the AKP, allowing Erdoğan to attain his victory comparatively easily and continue his imposing stance at the negotiating table.

At the same time, the Kurdish political movement has forced the AKP to sit down at the table not because the latter’s grassroots bears no hostility towards the Kurds, but because the AKP government’s Mideast and Kurdish policies have failed. The negotiating table has been formed between the Kurdish National Freedom Movement and the AKP – meaning it is not a “platform for fraternization” between the Kurdish people and the AKP’s grassroots. The June Revolt, however, presents a platform for the fostering of fraternity between the Kurdish National Freedom Movement and the people of Turkey.

Thus, when viewed from the concerns of Realpolitik and the interests of finding a lasting, democratic solution to the Kurdish problem, the Kurdish political movement could maximize its gains if it actively participated in the June Revolt.

***

As the revolt strives to create alternatives for a new order, it is important to recognize the risks that the revolt could be transformed into a “step” or that its current political targets could be diluted (as was the case with the Susurluk case).

No one should expect that the current revolt will produce a “post-modern coup” as was the case in the Susurluk process. At this stage, the most pressing risk is that the movement will be weakened by tensions within the AKP and new distributions of power. This is precisely the aim of the creation of a negotiating platform consisting of President Abdullah Gül, Parliamentary Speaker Cemil Çiçek and the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) for the purposes of reaching a compromise by together keeping Erdoğan in check.

From the very beginning, the CHP headquarters has been unable to feel the people’s anger and energy; likewise, it has not believed (or even desired) that Erdoğan can be defeated by a people’s movement. The CHP headquarters would like the people to revolt against Erdoğan, albeit at the ballot boxes. In this, it must be recognized that the June Revolt will fizzle out if the goal is merely to keep Erdoğan in check, since this would merely allow the AKP government to recuperate while ensuring that the CHP will once again give the AKP a get-out-of-jail-free card.

Can the June Revolt Defeat Erdoğan?

The national and foreign manufacturers of “common sense” have been saying “no” to this question since the first days of the revolt, based on the observation that the AKP is too strong while the opposition is incapable of producing an alternative amid its weaknesses and divisions. The June Revolt, however, could overturn this assumption by creating a new reality. Genuine people’s revolts can completely upend existing forces, restructure the relationships between forces, smash what appears to be the most formidable extant political forces and clear a path for the emergence of new political forces onto the scene of history.

Currently there is a common supposition peddled by a mainstream media that has ignored the seven days of revolt, the CHP and several “opposition representatives” that the revolt will wane if the government shows “understanding and tolerance.”

This is actually a two-sided “wish”: The government should meet “the bare minimum” of the people’s desires, while the people should retreat to a position where they passively observe the provision of the concessions.

It is clear that the viability of this wish is weak in terms of both sides.

The government has been unsuccessful in convincing anyone on its line of “understanding and tolerance,” and it is easy to explain this phenomenon with reference to Erdoğan’s mentally deficient stance toward the revolt – something that he shares with all dictators faced with such people’s rebellions.

Erdoğan, however, knows something that we don’t in that he must have realized the possibility that the June Revolt could trigger his downfall, thereby convincing him of the need to focus on defeating the revolt. In short, Erdoğan believes that if he can’t “defeat the revolt,” he will lose power – a supposition that could be very correct.

The validity of whether adopting a line of “understanding and tolerance” will cause the revolt to wane is debatable. His choice to insult members of the movement with pronouncements that they are “marauders” or “drunks” or that the pots-and-pans protests have all been done before has certainly inflamed the situation. Despite this, it would not be correct to suggest that a people’s movement that has set the entire country on fire was ignited simply by the prime minister’s “declarations.” Is it possible that a people who have found liberty in battling to destroy an omnipotent government will willingly agree to return to the chains binding them to their homes and workplaces without the imposition of the tremendous pressures and acts of coercion that produced their revolt in the first place?

The AKP government has presented us with two options: Victory for the AKP dictatorship or its defeat!

Can the June Revolt defeat Erdoğan? It can!

Can the June Revolt defeat the AKP government? That is the real question…

4 June 2013